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I. INTRODUCTION
The ‘rule of law’ is undoubtedly one of the most powerful expressions in the modern world.1 In a sense, it has become an activity in itself, a mental-social phenomenon which exists within 
human consciousness and acts independently within physical social real-
ity,2 like a pat on the back or a slap in the face. Or, to put it differently, 
through the cognitive process of the human mind, the language of the 
rule of law has not only represented reality, but has also played a leading 
role in the creation and transformation of reality; accordingly, it has con-
tributed to the modelling of the shared consciousness of society,3 includ-
ing that of international society.
While the various ideas associated with the expression are undoubt-
edly very old4—going as far back as Plato and Aristotle—the emergence 
of the rule of law as a potent discursive tool within political and legal 
circles has been relatively recent.5 The phrase itself was actually coined by 
nineteenth-century British author Albert Venn Dicey,6 in his masterpiece 
1 On the role of language, especially in the context of international law, see S Beaulac, The 
Power of Language in the Making of International Law—The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel 
and the Myth of Westphalia (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004).
2 This borrows from the speech-act theory of JL Austin, How to do Things with Words 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
3 On the creation and transformation of human-constructed reality through the use of 
language, see L Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 1961); and 
L Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).
4 See JN Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’ in AC Hutchinson and P Monahan 
(eds), The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) p 1.
5 See J Rose, ‘The Rule of Law in the Western World: An Overview’ (2004) 35 Journal of 
Social Philosophy 457 at 457.
6 See HW Arendt, ‘The Origins of Dicey’s Concept of the “Rule of Law”’ (1957) 31 
Australian Law Journal 117.
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Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution.7 It is from this point 
in time that this chapter takes up the rule of law, originally developed at 
the domestic level, with a view to seeing how an externalised version of 
the concept may be projected onto the international plane.
Writing at the turn of the millennium, Paul Johnson referred to the 
establishment of the rule of law within nation states as ‘the most impor-
tant political development of the second millennium’; he ventured to 
predict, in his optimistic conclusion, that the development of a global or 
international rule of law ‘is likely to be among the achievements of the 
third millennium’.8 Adopting a more prudent tone, in his book On the 
Rule of Law, Brian Tamanaha argued that the first project, the rule of law 
on a national level, ‘remains a work in progress’, while the second one, the 
rule of law internationally, ‘has only just begun’.9 But it has indeed begun, 
and not only at the normative level, but also at the functional level and, to 
a lesser degree, at the institutional level.
The following discussion starts, in Section II, with a survey of how the 
rule of law has developed in domestic law, focusing on the contributions of 
legal (as well as political) scholars. Section III then sets out the main goal of 
the chapter, which is to externalise the core values of the rule of law onto the 
international plane in order to examine how they can be found in the essen-
tial features of the international legal system. Two variables are examined 
for the purpose of this study, namely the version of the rule of law (limited 
to a formal level) and the definition of international law (limited to its tra-
ditional understanding). The conclusion then briefly revisits the theme of 
language as social power in relation to the international rule of law.
II. THE RULE OF LAW DEFINED
Although admittedly a convenient shortcut, starting our discussion of 
the meaning of the rule of law with its modern articulation by Albert 
Venn Dicey has little risk of running into strong opposition.10 His concep-
tion is well known and largely accepted; it has also been analysed and 
criticised from a variety of angles,11 thus adding to the credibility of his 
formulation.
 7 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 
1885).
 8 P Johnson, ‘Laying Down the Law: Britain and America Led the Way in Establi shing 
Legal Regimes Based on Universal Principles’, Wall Street Journal, 10 March 1999, A22.
 9 BZ Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) p 127.
10 See NB Reynolds, ‘Grounding the Rule of Law’ (1989) 2 Ratio Juris 1.
11 See I Stewart, ‘Men of Class: Aristotle, Montesquieu and Dicey on “Separation of Powers” 
and “The Rule of Law”’ (2004) 4 Macquarie Law Journal 187; and BJ Hibbitts, ‘The Politics of 
Principle: Albert Venn Dicey and the Rule of Law’ (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 1.
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A. Dicey’s Theory of the Rule of Law
Dicey wrote that the rule of law had ‘three meanings, or may be regarded 
from three different points of view’.12 First, the expression means ‘the 
absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power’.13 He further opined:
We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made 
to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in 
the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense 
the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the 
exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of 
constraint.14
The second prong of Dicey’s rule of law means ‘equality before the law, or 
the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the law adminis-
tered by the ordinary law courts’.15 He explained this as follows:
We mean, in the second place, when we speak of the ‘rule of law’ as a charac-
teristic of our country, not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what 
is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is 
subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary tribunals.16
Third, according to Dicey, the rule of law entails that ‘the laws of the 
constitution … are not the source but the consequence of the rights of 
individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts’.17 This last element is 
really a ‘special attribute of English institutions’, that is, of British consti-
tutionalism. He also wrote:
We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground 
that the general principles of the constitution (as for example the right to per-
sonal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with us the result of judicial 
decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought 
before the courts; whereas under many foreign constitutions the security (such 
as it is) given to the rights of individuals results, or appears to result, from the 
general principles of the constitution.18
A common misreading of the last element in Dicey’s theory holds that the 
rule of law requires the recognition of some minimal substantive rights 
and freedoms for individuals. As Paul Craig pointed out, however, this 
12 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th edn (London: 
Macmillan, 1961) p 202.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, p 188.
15 Ibid, p 202.
16 Ibid, p 193 [footnotes omitted].
17 Ibid, p 203.
18 Ibid, pp 195–6 [footnotes omitted].
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‘is not what Dicey actually said’.19 Rather, Dicey simply suggested that, 
provided a society wishes to give protection to individual rights, that is, if 
and only if there has been a political will to provide such legal guarantees, 
then, one way of doing it is better than another way as far as the rule of 
law is concerned. Namely, the British common law technique ought to 
be favoured over the Continental written constitutional document tech-
nique. This point is important because ‘Dicey’s third limb of the rule of 
law is no more substantive than the previous two’, as Craig put it: ‘It no 
more demands the existence of certain specific substantive rights than do 
the earlier limbs of his formulation’.20 
B. The Critics of the Rule of Law
To summarise, for Dicey, the constitutional principle of the rule of law 
involves: (1) being ruled by law and not by discretionary power; (2) equality 
before the law, for private individuals as well as government officials; and 
(3) being subject to the general jurisdiction of ordinary courts, which is the 
best source of legal protection. These core ideas, in one form of another, can 
be found in the scholarship of most modern authors who have written on the 
question, whether in the legal studies or the political science literature.21
This does not mean, however, that there is any kind of consensus or 
agreement on the meaning and scope of the rule of law; in fact, the oppo-
site seems to prevail. Some criticisms have been voiced over the years on 
the vagueness and uncertainty of the concept, with Joseph Raz famously 
calling the rule of law a mere slogan;22 borrowing from Walter Gallie,23 
one author suggested it was an ‘essentially contested concept.’24 Witness 
also the harsh assessment given by Judith Shklar:
It would not be very difficult to show that the phrase ‘the Rule of Law’ has 
become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use. It 
may well have become just another one of those self-congratulatory rhetori-
cal devices that grace the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians. No 
intellectual effort need therefore be wasted on this bit of ruling-class chatter.25
19 P Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conception of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework’ [1997] Public Law 467 at 473.
20 Ibid, p 474.
21 See J Stapleton, ‘Dicey and his Legacy’ (1995) 16 History of Political Thought 234; and 
J Rose, n 5 above, p 458.
22 J Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, in J Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979)) p 210.
23 WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955–56) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 167.
24 See J Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 
21 Law and Philosophy 137.
25 Shklar, n 4 above, p 1.
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Similarly, George Fletcher famously referred to the rule of law as the most 
puzzling ‘of all the dreams that drive men and women into the streets’.26
C. Categorising the Rule of Law
In an attempt to introduce some semblance of order into the discourse 
on the rule of law, some scholars have put the different versions or for-
mulations of the concept into categories or models. Paul Craig suggested 
drawing a distinction between the formal conceptions of the rule of law, 
concerned with how the law is made and its essential attributes (clear, 
prospective), and the substantive conceptions of the rule of law, concerned 
not only with the formal precepts but also with some basic content of the 
law (justice, morality).27 Brian Tamanaha picked up this classification 
and further divided up the formal and substantive models, making the 
alternative versions go progressively from ‘thinner’ to ‘thicker’ accounts, 
that is, moving from versions with fewer requirements to ones with more 
requirements, with each subsequent version including the components of 
the previous ones. Thus, starting with the formal conceptions of the rule 
of law, the thinnest is (1) the ‘rule-by-law’ (law as instrument of govern-
ment), then (2) ‘formal legality’ (law that is general, prospective, clear, 
certain), with the thickest of the formal versions adding (3) ‘democracy’ to 
legality (consent determines content of law); this is then followed by the 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law, which all encompass the for-
mal elements but also refer to other legal features such as (4) ‘individual 
rights’ (property, contract, privacy, autonomy), as well as a thicker-still 
version, which includes (5) ‘rights of dignity and/or justice’ and, finally, 
the thickest of the models of the substantive rule of law, and indeed of all 
versions, entailing a dimension of (6) ‘social welfare’ (substantive equal-
ity, welfare, preservation of community).28
For the purposes of the present chapter, which concerns the externalisa-
tion of the rule of law, the formal understanding of the concept suffices. 
In fact, to address legality per se at the international level is already a 
monumental task, not to speak of an inquiry into whether the legal rules 
in question amount to good law or bad law. Joseph Raz’s comments are 
of relevance here:
If the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is to 
propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the term lacks any useful 
function. We have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to 
26 GP Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996) p 11.
27 Craig, n 19 above.
28 Tamanaha, n 9 above, pp 91ff.
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discover that to believe in it is to believe that good should triumph. The rule 
of law is a political ideal which a legal system may lack or possess to a greater 
or lesser degree. That much is common ground. It is also to be insisted that the 
rule of law is just one of the virtues by which a legal system may be judged and 
by which it is to be judged.29
These remarks apply a fortiori to the present study, which identifies the 
core features of the rule of law with a view to analysing the situation 
on the international plane. In this context, Robert Summers is right to 
note that insofar as formal conceptions of the rule of law are content-
independent, political neutrality makes them preferable to substantive 
versions,30 which, it should be added, is especially the case outside the 
national realm. But having said that, the formal features of the rule of 
law must be understood broadly, as the classical notion of ‘formalism’ 
allows us to do, namely as including all the attributes of a thing—here, 
law—that are of such significance as to define it.31
D. Formal Versions of the Rule of Law
When focusing on the formal conceptions of the rule of law, it is useful to 
examine the work of Friedrich Hayek, who elaborated on the core ideas 
expressed by Dicey. Hayek’s definition of the rule of law, taken from The 
Road to Serfdom, has undoubtedly over the years become one of the most 
influential:
[S]tripped of all technicalities this [the rule of law] means that government in 
all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which 
make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its 
coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on 
the basis of this knowledge.32
As he argued in another book, The Political Idea of the Rule of Law, legal 
systems adhering to the rule of law have three necessary attributes: ‘the 
laws must be general, equal and certain’.33
A number of scholars in legal studies and social and political sciences 
have followed this modest, largely positivist version of the rule of law, 
advocating limited models that emphasise the formalistic or process-
oriented aspects. Lon Fuller, for instance, argues in favour of a system 
of general rules, which are created and applied consistently with 
29 Raz, n 22 above, p 211.
30 See R Summers ‘A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law’ (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 12.
31 See M Stone, ‘Formalism’ in J Coleman and S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p 166. 
32 FA Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1944) p 54.
33 FA Hayek, The Political Idea of the Rule of Law (Cairo: National Bank of Egypt, 1955) p 34.
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 procedural justice and fairness.34 Accordingly, eight conditions must be 
met: (1) a  system of rules; (2) promulgation and publication of the rules; 
(3)  avoidance of retroactive application; (4) clear and intelligible rules;
(5) avoidance of contradictory rules; (6) practicable rules; (7) consis-
tency of rules over time and (8) congruence between official actions 
and declared rules.35 To borrow Jeremy Waldron’s image, this is ‘a sort 
of laundry list of features that a healthy legal system should have’.36 
A similar enumeration of eight factors essential to the rule of law is 
given by John Finnis, which all relate to formal aspects of law; that 
is, to attributes of law that are so significant to law as to define what 
law is.37 
Joseph Raz, too, proposes a list of, yet again, eight elements that ought 
to be found in a rule of law system. However, they are slightly differently 
formulated than Fuller’s and Finnis’s, although there is considerable 
overlap with the latter’s list: (1) all law should be prospective, open and 
clear; (2) law should be relatively stable; (3) the making of particular 
laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear and 
general rules; (4) the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 
(5) the principles of natural justice must be observed; (6) the courts should 
have review powers over the implementation of the other principles; 
(7) the courts should be easily accessible and (8) the discretion of the 
crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.38 
This list, Raz continues, is merely illustrative and is not meant to be 
exhaustive. In fact, he opines that all of these factors boil down to one 
proposition: ‘in the final analysis the doctrine [of the rule of law] rests 
on its basic idea that the law should be capable of providing effective 
guidance’.39 In his more recent writings on the subject, in Ethics in the 
Public Domain, Raz spoke of the rule of law quite singularly in terms of 
the ‘principled faithful application of the law’.40
At this stage of the discussion, it feels as though we have come full 
circle, back to Dicey’s core idea that the rule of law ‘connotes a climate 
of legality and of legal order’.41 With a little more meat on the bones, 
the three limbs remain: (1) the existence of principled normative rules, 
(2) adequately created and equally applicable to all legal subjects and 
34 L Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969).
35 Ibid, pp 38–9.
36 Waldron, n 24 above, p 154.
37 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) p 270.
38 Raz, n 22 above, pp 214–18.
39 Ibid, p 218. 
40 J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays on the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) p 373.
41 ECS Wade (ed), in his introduction to the 10th edition of Dicey’s Introduction to the Study 
of the Law of the Constitution, n 12 above, p cx.
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(3) enforced by accessible courts of general jurisdiction. These 
 characteristics shall now be externalised, as the discussion moves to 
whether or not they are reflected onto the international plane.
III. THE RULE OF LAW EXTERNALISED
It is first important to clarify what is meant by externalisation. It is the 
process by which a feature or characteristic that exists within the inside 
set is projected or attributed to circumstances or causes that are pres-
ent in the outside space according to an internal–external dichotomous 
structure. To give an example, let us take the terminology of ‘sover-
eignty’, a concept that was articulated in modern terms during the 
sixteenth century by Frenchman Jean Bodin.42 The history of the word 
‘sovereignty’ shows that, in the eighteenth century, the Swiss author 
Emer de Vattel externalised the main ideas associated with this internal 
(domestic) notion and made sovereignty relevant for the discourse of 
international law; in fact, it became one of its core foundational prin-
ciples.43 My goal with the rule of law is more modest, of course, but 
the task at hand is to pick up the essential elements of the concept, 
understood in its formal versions, and examine in what ways they 
may be found in international law. Accordingly, this section will assess: 
(1) the existence of principled legal normativity on the international 
plane; (2) how these norms are made and are applicable equally to all 
legal subjects and (3) the way in which normativity is enforced through 
adjudication.
A word of caution is in order at this point. Just as sovereignty could 
only be externalised mutatis mutandis44 by Vattel, the present project 
requires some material adjustments to the features of the rule of law in 
order to take into account the different nature of the international legal 
order. What are these distinctions between domestic legal systems and the 
international legal system? Drawing an exhaustive list is both extremely 
difficult and somewhat futile, but the following categories of distinctions 
may be offered and should be borne in mind during the process of exter-
nalising the rule of law. They relate to the sources of law, to legal subjects 
and to compliance. In summary, there is no one formal norm-creating 
authority on the international level; states (not individuals) remain the 
principal legal actors and there is no enforcement mechanism (such as a 
police force).
42 See S Beaulac, ‘The Social Power of Bodin’s “Sovereignty” and International Law’ 
(2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1.
43 See S Beaulac, ‘Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of Sovereignty’ (2003) 5 Journal 
of the History of International Law 237.
44 That is, with respective differences taken into consideration.
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A. Principled Legal Normativity
In a recent article on the relationship between international law and 
domestic law, Mattias Kumm uses a form of externalised rule of law.45 
He too discards the substantive versions of the concept and concentrates 
on the narrower understanding, that is, what he suggests is the literal 
meaning of the expression, namely to rule ‘by law’.46 It has already been 
explained above why, like Kumm, I believe that it is the formal rule of law 
that ought to be externalised on the international plane, bearing in mind 
that ‘formalism’ refers to the attributes of law that are so significant to it as 
to define what law is.47 To be ruled by law (that is, government by law, not 
by men) at the international level means, according to Kumm, the follow-
ing: ‘The addressees of international law, states in particular, should obey 
the law. They should treat it as authoritative and let it guide and constrain 
their actions.’48 The international rule of law requires at the very least 
some basic legal ordering of affairs within a society, which international 
society no doubt enjoys.
Today, indeed few people would seriously doubt that there is a body 
of norms that enjoy the characteristics and pedigree of law on the inter-
national plane.49 International law is regarded as true positive law, which 
forms part of a real legal system, in which ‘every international situation 
is capable of being determined as a matter of law’,50 as Robert Jennings 
and Arthur Watts have put it. These two British authors also argue that 
the legal determination of such issues occurs ‘either by the application of 
specific legal rules where they already exist, or by the application of legal 
rules derived, by the use of known legal techniques, from other legal rules 
or principles’.51 Whilst framed in positivist legal terms, and thus open to 
possible strong objections,52 the following discussion favours a concept of 
law that is broad enough to include international law.
i. Certainty, Predictability and Stability
Borrowing from Dicey, but also from Hayek and Raz, the rule of law 
requires that normativity reach a degree of development sufficient to 
45 M Kumm, ‘International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of Law and 
the Limits of the Internationalist Model’ (2003–04) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 19.
46 Ibid, p 22.
47 See nn 30–31 above and accompanying text.
48 Kumm, n 45 above, p 22.
49 See TM Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), who speaks of the post-ontological era of international law.
50 R Jennings and A Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol 1, 9th edn (London: 
Longman, 1992) pp 12–13.
51 Ibid.
52 See the classic piece by GL Williams, ‘International Law and the Controversy 
Concerning the Word “Law”’ (1945) 22 British Yearbook of International Law 146. 
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provide for certainty, predictability and stability. These values are not 
absolute, however, and some degree of vagueness and uncertainty in law 
is inevitable in any legal system, be it national or international. At the 
national level, both the US and Canada, for instance, have developed so-
called ‘void for vagueness’ doctrines that address the need for certainty 
and predictability in domestic statutes, with intelligibility standards that 
allow for a good dose of ‘open texture’ in legislative language, to quote 
from Hart.53
At the international level, the sources of international law are set out in 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute),54 at Article 
38(1), the principal ones being treaties, customs and general principles of 
law. Here, a fundamental difference between international and domestic 
legal systems ought to be mentioned at the outset, thus justifying a slight 
adjustment in the required level of certainty in the law. Arthur Watts 
explained it thus:
[I]nternational law has no central legislator, nor any legislative process in the 
normal (municipal) sense of the term; its norm-creating process is essentially 
decentralised, and so far as international conferences or meetings within 
international organisations may produce quasi-legislative texts the outcome 
represents ‘legislation’ by negotiation and compromise, which is not a process 
calculated to produce precision and clarity.55
This being so, the level of certainty, predictability and stability shown 
by international legal norms, assessed according to a somewhat reduced 
standard justified under the international rule of law, are no doubt 
adequate in a number of different substantive areas. They include interna-
tional human rights law, international economic law, international labour 
law, international humanitarian law, the international law of the sea, the 
international law of state responsibility and international criminal law.
ii. Limiting Discretionary (Arbitrary) Power
The argument for a minimal rule of law at the international level finds 
further support when one recalls that the ideal of the rule of law with 
regard to the existence of principled legal normativity relates to the need 
to circumscribe sovereignty which, in its absolute form, may lead to arbi-
trary power. The issue boils down to how a system can limit or curtail the 
discretionary power of those who hold authority in a given society. When 
transposed onto the international plane, it is sovereignty understood 
53 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1957–58) 71 Harvard 
Law Review 593. 
54 1 UNTS xvi.
55 A Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1993) 36 German Yearbook of International Law 
15 at 28.
The Rule of Law in International Law Today  207
externally that must be addressed through the international rule of law. 
The definition of external sovereignty given by Arbitrator Huber in the 
Island of Palmas case thus remains very relevant indeed for the present 
discussion: ‘Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies inde-
pendence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right 
to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a 
State.’56
However, external sovereignty also means that, vis-à-vis the outside 
world, states have absolute power that is unrestricted but for the first 
ideal of the (international) rule of law, namely the existence of a system 
of positive law. Judge Anzilotti, writing a separate opinion in the Austro-
German Customs Union case, encapsulated this feature well when he spoke 
of ‘sovereignty (suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant 
that the State has over it no other authority than that of international 
law’.57 The sovereign independence of states, allowing for unrestricted 
assertions of power, must be balanced—and indeed is balanced—by the 
ideal of the international rule of law relating to principled legal normativ-
ity. Arthur Watts put it as follows:
It is, of course, the case that States on occasion act in breach of the law, and 
perhaps even sometimes in complete and wilful disregard of the law … What 
the rule of law requires is that in their international relations States conduct 
themselves within an essentially legal framework; it is action which is despotic, 
capricious, or otherwise unresponsive to legal regulation which is incompatible 
with the international rule of law.58
Although a detailed empirical demonstration of the argument will have 
to wait for another day, it may nevertheless be suggested with confidence 
that the extensive body of international legal rules in many substantive areas, 
referred to above, does limit and curtail the exercise of discretionary power, 
as well as arbitrary power, by states in their relations with others.59
B. Adequate Creation and Equal Application of Legal Norms
Many international legal scholars, including perhaps Mattias Kumm,60 
would stop here and acknowledge the ‘international rule of law’ because 
its one principal ingredient has been found. At the normative level, the con-
duct of states in their relations is ‘ruled by law’, that is, by  international 
56 Island of Palmas case (1928) 2 RIAA 829, at 838. 
57 Austro-German Customs Union case (1931), PCIJ Series A/B, no 41, p 57.
58 Watts, n 55 above, p 33.
59 Ibid, p 23.
60 Note 45 above.
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normativity that is sufficiently certain, predictable and stable. The 
 minimum exists on the international plane; the first leg of Dicey’s rule of 
law theory. But what about the international rule of law in its functional 
dimensions? More specifically, how are norms created in the international 
realm and do they apply equally to all legal subjects?
i. Promulgation and Publication
The first part of the inquiry essentially pertains to the promulgation and 
publication of written legal norms. To borrow from Raz, this rule of law 
value concerns the making of laws, which should be guided by open, 
stable, clear and general principles.61 In the context of domestic law, 
the activity studied under this heading is legislation, the main source 
of written legal norms, with the analysis scrutinising the parliamentary 
process of legislative enactment. In the context of international law, 
the (imperfect) parallel is with treaties, one of the three formal sources 
of law under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice and the source of written legal norms on the international plane, 
as opposed to customs that constitute the source of international non-
written rules.62 The general principles of law are also of less interest 
because, by definition, they are extracted from domestic legal systems 
(in foro domestico) and, accordingly, should be deemed to pursue rule of 
law values.
When focusing on the process by which written normativity is pro-
mulgated by means of treaties on the international plane, one is struck by 
the level of sophistication in the relevant rules found in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.63 Some 108 states have ratified the 
Vienna Convention,64 which has been in force since January 1980; even 
those states that are not conventionally bound by it recognise that, for the 
most part, the rules contained in it do nevertheless apply to them because 
they also reflect customary international law.65 In short, it is one of the 
most universal international instruments, second perhaps only to the 
Charter of the United Nations.66 In any event, for our purposes, it is suf-
ficient to say that the Vienna Convention provides for all essential aspects 
61 J Raz, n 22 above , p 215.
62 On the judge-made-law/customary international law parallel, see S Beaulac, ‘Customary 
International Law in Domestic Courts: Imbroglio, Lord Denning, Stare Decisis’ in CPM 
Waters (ed), British and Canadian Perspectives on International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006) p 379 at p 392.
63 1155 UNTS 331 (1969).
64 As of 1 January 2007.
65 See MN Shaw, International Law, 5th edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003) p 633.
66 Charter of the United Nations (not published in the UNTS), Can TS 1945 No 7 (1945).
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of international treaties: conclusion, ratification, reservations application, 
interpretation, validity, termination, and so on.
With respect to the publication of conventional international law, it 
should be pointed out that transparency has been formally laid down 
as a guiding principle since 1945 with the signing of the Charter of the 
United Nations, Article 102 of which provides that only treaties registered 
with the Secretariat can be invoked within the UN system. This essential 
requirement is also found in Article 80(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. They are all published, updated and, nowadays, readily 
available in electronic form;67 in fact, not only the UN but also domestic 
legal agencies in many states make treaties easily accessible to the pub-
lic.68 Accessibility has become markedly less problematic following the 
advent of the internet.
ii. Universality and Sovereign Equality
Does the existing system of legal norms based on treaties, as well as on 
other sources of law such as custom and general principles of law, apply 
equally to all legal subjects? Equality is indeed the other functional dimen-
sion of the rule of law that must be examined. It is important to recall one 
of the distinctive features of the international legal order, namely that 
states continue to be the principal actors on the international plane by vir-
tue of the fact that they have inherent and unrestricted legal personalities 
(something, of course, that international organisations, corporations and 
individuals do not have). At risk of being branded overly traditionalist, 
I shall limit the discussion to the situation of states and how international 
law treats them; equality as it relates to non-state actors (although, intui-
tively, leading to similar conclusions) is a question for another occasion. 
One angle to the issue of equality concerns universality; that is, whether 
or not international law applies to all the states in the world. Not too 
long ago, international law was, to a very large extent, the public law of 
Europe, relevant to the states of that continent;69 everywhere else was 
basically terra nullius, available for colonisation or other forms of territo-
rial exploitation.70 This situation has, of course, drastically changed, with 
the different phases of decolonisation in Latin America and in Africa up 
until the early 1970s, and the latest episodes of liberation from Soviet 
67 See the following website: http://untreaty.un.org/.
68 See, for example, in Canada, the following website: http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/.
69 See A Orakhelashvili, ‘The Idea of European International Law’ (2006) 17 European 
Journal of International Law 315 at 336–8.
70 See AP Rubin, ‘International Law in the Age of Columbus’ (1992) 29 Netherlands 
International Law Review 5; and MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward 
Territories in International Law (London: Longmans, Green, 1926).
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imperialism in Eastern Europe and in many parts of Asia during the 
1990s.71 Membership of the international community is now truly global, 
therefore making international law fully universal both in scope and in 
reach. There are, of course, some international legal scholars who love to 
remind us that international law was born in Europe and that there are, no 
doubt, continuing biases in favour of Western interests and ideologies.72 
But none of these authors would dare question the universality of inter-
national law, or dispute that its normativity is applicable to all members 
of the international community.
One primordial value of the rule of law—found in Dicey, Hayek and 
Raz, as well as others—relates to the need for all legal subjects to enjoy 
equality before the law. In international law, there is a long-standing prin-
ciple, dating back to the classical legal scholarship on the subject, that 
all states of the international community, although (like human beings) 
not at all equal in absolute terms,73 stand equally within the normative 
system.74 Already in the eighteenth century, Emer de Vattel wrote the fol-
lowing on the legal equality of states:
Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in their rights and 
obligations, as equally proceeding from nature—Nations composed of men, 
and considered as so many free persons living together in a state of nature, 
are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. 
Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is 
as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the 
most powerful kingdom.75
Accordingly, equality of states in international law means that ‘whatever 
is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any other; and whatever is 
unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the other’.76
Since the signing of the Charter of the United Nations, we speak of 
the sovereign equality of states,77 which constitutes one of the seven prin-
ciples of the organisation as set out in Article 2. With the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
71 See, generally, M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).
72 See M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’ 
(2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 113.
73 See RW Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
74 See B Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International 
Law 599 at 599.
75 E de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, trs J Chitty (Philadelphia, PA: Johnson Law Booksellers, 
1863) p lxii. 
76 Ibid.
77 On the origin and the development of the expression ‘sovereign equality’ in interna-
tional law, see RA Klein, Sovereign Equality Among States: The History of an Idea (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 1974).
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Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations,78 a General Assembly resolution adopted by the United Nations 
in 1970, sovereign equality became one of the basic principles of interna-
tional law. ‘All States enjoy sovereign equality,’ it reads. ‘They have equal 
rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, 
notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other 
nature.’ In particular, it provides that sovereign equality entails that states 
are ‘juridically equal’, that is to say, all members of the international com-
munity are equal in the eyes of the law.
The meaning of sovereign equality in international law for the purpose 
of the international rule of law must be explained further. Of course, it 
cannot mean that all legal norms apply to every state in the same way; 
some of them may only apply to certain states because of their situa-
tions.79 For instance, landlocked states are not submitted to most of the 
regime of the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea,80 
without thereby prejudicing whatsoever any equality value. What mat-
ters, really, is that no discrimination occurs in the way in which interna-
tional normativity applies to states. If you are a coastal state, the legal 
regime will apply to you just as it applies to all the other coastal states 
around the world, whether large or small, whether powerful or weak, 
whether militarily expansionist or pacifist. Arthur Watts explicated thus:
[A]ll States which come within the scope of a rule of law [i.e. international legal 
norm] must be treated equally in the application of that rule to them. There 
must, in other words, be uniformity of application of international law and no 
discrimination between States in their subjection to rules of law [i.e. interna-
tional legal norms] which in principle apply to them.81
Put in those terms, there is little doubt that the normativity on the inter-
national plane applies equally to all states, which are the main legal sub-
jects. In practice, there may be cases where one might wonder whether, 
for instance, the prohibition on the use of force applies in the same way 
to a superpower like the US, an obvious question in relation to the illegal 
invasion and occupation of Iraq. The theory remains clear, however, in 
that sovereign equality entails similarly situated states being treated in 
the same way by international law, with no discriminatory treatment 
tolerated by the system.
There is another aspect of the sovereign equality of states that should 
be noted for the present purposes, namely that states are not only 
equal in how legal norms apply to them, but are also equal in how they 
78 GA Res 2625 (XXV), UN Doc A/8028 (1970).
79 Watts, n 55 above, p 31.
80 1833 UNTS 396 (1982).
81 Watts, n 55 above, p 31.
212  Stéphane Beaulac
participate in the creation of international normativity.82 In relation 
to treaties, Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides: ‘Every State possesses the capacity to conclude treaties.’ It 
is also significant that treaty-making conferences generally favour an 
egalitarian procedure of one state, one vote for the negotiation and 
adoption of treaty texts. Moreover, the systems of reservations, entry 
into force, modification and termination of treaties, found in the Vienna 
Convention, assume that states participate equally in conventional 
regimes. As regards customary international law, a similar reasoning 
based on the ideal of sovereign equality is adopted.83 Indeed, the prac-
tice of every state with an interest in the legal issue (see the example of 
the law of the sea, above) as well as their opinion juris are both significant 
in the process of determining whether a custom has formed.84 This equal 
role in the formulation of international normativity provides further 
strength to the claim that the value of the rule of law relating to equality 
is projected onto the international plane.
C. Adjudicative Enforcement of Normativity
We now turn to what is without doubt the most difficult set of formal 
values associated with the rule of law in terms of externalisation onto 
the international plane, namely the presence of courts of general juris-
diction which are easily accessible to legal subjects for the adjudication 
of disputes ruled by international normativity. A few distinguishing 
aspects of the international legal system must be taken into account, 
with a view to adjusting the terms of inquiry into how these elements 
are reflected internationally. Here, too, the fact that states are the main 
(though no longer exclusive) subjects of international law is again 
relevant, which explains why the following discussion considers inter-
national judicial enforcement in the traditional sense, that is to say in 
cases involving disputes between states. In fact, the focus is on the 
International Court of Justice, ‘the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations’, according to Article 92 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and by far the most important in the international legal system. It is 
also useful to recall yet another distinctive feature of the international 
82 See N Krisch, ‘More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in 
International Law’ in M Byers and G Nolte (eds), United States Hegemony and the Foundations 
of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p 135.
83 See SJ Toope, ‘Powerful but Unpersuasive? The Role of the USA in the Evolution of 
Customary International Law’ in M Byers and G Nolte (eds), United States Hegemony and the 
Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p 135.
84 See, generally, MH Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ (1998) 
272 Recueil des Cours 155.
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legal system, namely that there is no system for guaranteeing ultimate 
compliance if states refuse to follow judicial decisions.85 This char-
acteristic, however, must not be overstated with the suggestion that 
judgments in international law are not binding. On the contrary, they 
are indeed binding on the parties to the case pursuant to Article 94 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, an aspect that will be explored in 
greater detail below.86
i. Court of General Jurisdiction
Having now made these preliminary points, the analysis will proceed 
first with the issue of whether international normative adjudication 
falls within a general jurisdiction. There is no doubt that there is a judi-
cial structure on the international plane, at the centre (though not the 
apex) of which is the International Court of Justice, which can deal 
with all legal disputes between states. The so-called ‘fragmentation’ 
of international law due to the multiplicity of international adjudica-
tive bodies has recently caused much ink to flow in international legal 
circles, the report by the International Law Commission (led by Martti 
Koskenniemi) being the latest manifestation.87 For present purposes, the 
risk that the many adjudicative bodies might apply international law 
differently, and so create ‘boxes’88 of normativity and ‘self-contained 
regimes’,89 can be dismissed. The intuition is that, under the leadership 
of the International Court of Justice, the dangers of fragmentation are 
manageable.
In theory, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over con-
tentious matters is plenary, as far as states are concerned.90 With respect 
to ratione personae jurisdiction, Article 34(1) of the ICJ Statute is clear: 
‘Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.’ In regard to ratione 
materiae jurisdiction, Article 36(1) provides: ‘The jurisdiction of the Court 
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially 
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
85 See, generally, B Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing 
Conceptions of International Law’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 345.
86 See nn 116–20 below and accompanying text.
87 International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study 
Group, 58th Session (2006), Doc A/CN/.4/L.682.
88 On the theory of ‘boxes’, see M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, 
Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies, 
availanle at www.ejls.eu/.
89 See B Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes 
in International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483.
90 See RY Jennings, ‘The Role of the International Court of Justice’ (1997) 68 British 
Yearbook of International Law 1.
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 conventions in force.’ Under Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute, the Court also 
has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions in non-contentious matters,91 a 
procedure that can be initiated not only by states, but also by ‘whatever 
body [that] may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations to make such a request’. At first glance, therefore, 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice seems to be compre-
hensive; one may even be tempted to draw an analogy with the inherent 
jurisdiction of domestic courts.
Of course, this picture is a mere illusion, as the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice is anything but comprehensive, let alone 
inherent. Indeed, it is well known that the contentious jurisdiction of the 
Court depends in all cases on whether or not the states involved have 
consented to the judicial proceedings.92 This feature is usually referred 
to as the lack of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice—or any international adjudicative body for that matter93—over 
contentious matters. To put it another way, states cannot be forced to 
appear before a court or tribunal in order to settle a legal dispute by 
means of adjudication. This position is explained by the traditional 
notion of state sovereignty and by the voluntary (that is, consensual) 
normative theory of international law.94 At this point of the inquiry, I 
would agree with Arthur Watts that: ‘Such a purely consensual basis for 
the judicial settlement of legal disputes cannot be satisfactory in terms 
of the rule of law.’95
However, the situation proves to be not so bad given that, in reality, 
states do not have to consent on a case-by-case basis each time they are 
involved in a legal dispute. States can give their consent in advance to 
the jurisdiction of an adjudicative body in regard to future disputes; 
with respect to the ICJ, as Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute provides 
that states
may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:(a) the 
interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence 
of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation; (d) the nature of extent of the reparation to be made for the breach 
of an international obligation.
91 See P-O Savoie, ‘La CIJ, l’avis consultative et la fonction judiciaire: entre décision et 
consultation’ (2005) 42 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 35.
92 See S Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–2005, Vol II, 
Jurisdiction (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) p 549.
93 See, generally, J Allain, A Century of International Adjudication—The Rule of Law and its 
Limits (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2000).
94 See Rosenne, n 92 above, pp 549–50.
95 Watts, n 55 above, p 37.
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This is known as the ‘optional clause’ to the contentious jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice.96
There are commitments to the same effect found in a number of other 
treaties, by which states consent in advance to the jurisdiction of an 
international court to settle legal disputes covered by the conventional 
regime. These dispute settlement provisions may be optional, leaving 
states the option to accept the jurisdiction as cases arise, or they may be 
mandatory for parties to the treaty, thus leaving no choice as to whether 
to submit to the adjudicative body in a particular dispute. This latter 
situation, as well as those involving the ICJ ‘optional clause’, is the clos-
est one gets to a general jurisdiction on the international plane. Although 
not a perfect scenario, it goes in the right direction in pursuing the 
value of the rule of law pertaining to the enforcement of normativity, 
especially given the reality of state sovereignty in the international 
realm.97
ii. Judicial Review
An issue related to that of general jurisdiction is whether or not the 
International Court of Justice has competence to exercise judicial review 
of the decisions and actions of the other organs of the United Nations 
system,98 including the Security Council. The power to review the acts of 
the latter is the most difficult—and controversial—question; in a sense, 
however, an affirmative answer would lay the ground for recognising 
a general competence of international judicial review for the ICJ. This 
would be a clear gain for the rule of law concerning the legality of deci-
sions on the international plane, in particular with respect to the matters 
falling within the competence of what is considered the ‘executive’ of the 
United Nations, the Security Council.
It is instructive to go back to 1945, at the time of the adoption of the 
Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco,99 where Belgium sug-
gested establishing a procedure by which disputes between UN organs 
over the interpretation of the UN Charter would be referred to the 
International Court of Justice, thus giving it a sort of supervisory judicial 
96 See F Orrego Vicun˘a, ‘The Legal Nature of the Optional Clause and the Right of a State 
to Withdraw a Declaration Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice’ in N Ando, E McWhinney and R Wolfrum (eds), Liber amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p 463.
97 See S Oda, ‘The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ: A Myth? A Statistical Analysis of 
Contentious Cases’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 251.
98 See HK Hubbard, ‘Separation of Powers within the United Nations: A Revised Role for 
the International Court of Justice’ (1985) 38 Stanford Law Review 165.
99 See, generally, S Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–2005, Vol 
I, The Court and the United Nations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) pp 57–60.
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role.100 The proposal was, however, rejected. In the Certain Expenses case, 
the ICJ gave effect to the intention of the constituting authority not to 
empower it with a judicial review function:
In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for determining the 
validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure 
is to be found in the structure of the United Nations. Proposals made during the 
drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in 
the International Court of Justice were not accepted.101
In the Namibia case in 1971, the Court once again held that it ‘does not 
possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the decisions 
taken by the United Nations organs concerned’.102 In fact, the ICJ has 
always adopted a sort of presumption of legality in favour of UN organs, 
which translates into a high degree of judicial deference shown for their 
decisions. Therefore, save the most fundamental irregularities, there is 
little (in fact, no) chance of the Court exercising a power of judicial review, 
especially with respect to the Security Council.
This position represents the traditional thinking on the issue which, 
however, seems to be in the process of reconsideration. In a recent speech 
given at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for 
instance, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of 
Justice, asked:
Are these [Security Council’s] decisions judicially reviewable for non-
arbitrariness and for constitutionality? This is one of the great unanswered 
questions: The International Court of Justice is a main organ of the UN and 
its principal judicial organ. Whether it may judicially review the decisions 
of other organs, taken within the field of their allocated competence, is not 
yet fully determined.103
The Lockerbie case104 would have provided the opportunity for the Court 
to address questions of judicial review insofar as Libya challenged deci-
sions by the Security Council on sanctions in relation to the Pan Am Flight 
103 affair. However, the case was withdrawn, leaving these issues to be 
100 United Nations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
(San Francisco Conference, 1945), Vol 13 (New York, United Nations Information Organizations, 
1946) pp 645 and 668.
101 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (1962) ICJ 
Reports 151 at 168.
102 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (1971) ICJ Reports 16 at 45.
103 R Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the United Nations System, and the Rule of Law’, London School 
of Economics and Political Science, 13 November 2006, p 2, available at www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20061113_Higgins.pdf.
104 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Provisional Measures, (1992) ICJ Reports 1. The Lockerbie case was 
discontinued on 10 September 2003 by Order of the Court, (2003) ICJ Reports 325.
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reconsidered at a later date. There are more signs now, however, that the 
International Court of Justice is getting ready to embrace a judicial review 
function, with some even suggesting that it is an emerging general prin-
ciple of law,105 which would be excellent news for the international rule 
of law.
iii. Independence and Impartiality
This part of the inquiry, on judicial independence and impartiality, is 
straightforward because virtually nobody questions these attributes 
with regard to the International Court of Justice.106 In Article 2 of the ICJ 
Statute the first provision under the heading ‘Organization of the Court’, 
provides as follows:
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regard-
less of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who pos-
sess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment 
to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in 
international law.
Judges are elected jointly by the General Assembly and the Security 
Council of the United Nations, from a list provided by national authori-
ties. Pursuant to Article 33 of the ICJ Statute, the budget of the Court is 
voted by the General Assembly, although there is obviously no financial 
accountability between the two.
Impartiality, for its part, is addressed in Article 20 of the ICJ Statute, 
which provides that: ‘Every member of the Court shall, before taking up 
his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise 
his powers impartially and conscientiously’. The issues of incompatibil-
ity with outside activities and of previous involvement in other cases are 
regulated in Articles 16 and 17, respectively. With regard to the situation 
of ad hoc judges and their previous or subsequent work as legal agents, 
the Court has adopted practice statements. One feature of independence 
and impartiality is the judge’s freedom from dismissal, putting barriers 
in the way of the removal of judges from office; Article 18(1) of the ICJ 
Statute provides for the rule: ‘No member of the Court can be dismissed 
unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other members, he has ceased to 
fulfil the required conditions.’
Beyond these formal elements found in its constituting documents, 
the Court and its judges do enjoy a high degree of independence 
105 See E de Wet, ‘Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and its 
Implications for the ICJ’ (2000) 47 Netherlands International Law Review 181.
106 See G Guillaume, La Cour internationale de Justice à l’aube du XXIème siècle: Le regard d’un 
juge (Paris: Pedone, 2003) p 120.
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and have demonstrated great impartiality in practice. As the current 
President of the International Court of Justice, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, 
recently said:
Judges [are] nominated nationally but elected by the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, under terms whereby their conditions of service may not be 
altered during their tenure. Although the Court reports annually to the General 
Assembly on its year’s work, the judicial decisions are subject to no comment 
(still less rebuke) by the Assembly or its Members. There is a proper separation 
of powers, and the Judges of the ICJ are mercifully free of any pressures from 
their national governments. That the Court applies the law consistently and 
impartially is doubted nowhere.107
Though obviously not a disinterested opinion, it certainly represents the 
view of the very large majority of states involved in, and of people associ-
ated with, the international justice system.
iv. Accessibility
The courts and tribunals in a legal system must be easily accessible to 
all its legal subjects, something that is now examined with respect to 
the International Court of Justice. We saw earlier that, with the excep-
tion of the possibility of lodging a request for an advisory opinion,108 
there is no role for legal actors other than states in ICJ procedures; 
its contentious jurisdiction is indeed strictly limited to inter-state 
disputes.109 According to Article 35(1) of the ICJ Statute, the Court is 
open to the states that are parties to this instrument which, in fact, 
include all the states that are members of the United Nations,110 as well 
as non-member states ‘on conditions to be determined in each case 
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security 
Council’.111 Pursuant to Article 35(2) of the ICJ Statute, the Court is 
even open to states that are not parties to this instrument, on condi-
tions laid down again by the Security Council, although ‘in no case 
shall such conditions place the parties in a position of inequality before 
the Court’. There is an obvious effort to assure equal access and equal 
status to all states that may appear before of the International Court of 
Justice, which is indeed in agreement with the spirit of the rule of law 
as reflected onto the international plane.
107 Higgins, n 103 above, at 3.
108 Note 91 above and accompanying text.
109 Note 90 above and accompanying text.
110 See Art 93(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, which reads: ‘All Members 
of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.’
111 Ibid, Art 93(2).
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v. Effectiveness
Do states follow international law and, in particular, do they submit to the 
decisions of international adjudicators? In other words, is the international 
normativity as applied by the international judiciary effective? One recalls 
what Louis Henkin famously wrote about general compliance with inter-
national law: ‘It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost 
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost 
all of the time.’112 Although less catchy, Arthur Watts’ view is to the same 
effect: ‘In practice, the overwhelming tendency of States in their day-to -
day dealings with other States is to apply and abide by international law 
as a normal part of the regular pattern of international affairs.’113
The more important question, insofar as the rule of law value concern-
ing the enforcement of legal norms, is whether or not the decisions by 
the ICJ, after the full involvement of the international justice system in 
contentious cases, are followed through by the (losing) states. Put differ-
ently, when push comes to shove, and a state must really choose between 
ultimate compliance with international normativity as decided through 
adjudication, does it honour the international rule of law? On this issue, 
remarks made by Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the ICJ, are again 
apposite:
Contrary to a widespread misconception, the Court’s Judgments are both bind-
ing and almost invariably complied with. Out of the 91 contentious cases that 
the Court has dealt with since 1946, only 4 have in fact presented problems of 
compliance and, of these, most problems have turned out to be temporary.114
Indeed, there is a perturbing myth among people interested in the inter-
national justice system to the effect that states not only retain a discretion-
ary power to comply with international judicial decisions, but actually 
use it to reject them. Empirically, this is simply not true.115
Article 94(1) of the Charter of the United Nations sets out in clear 
terms the legal obligation to comply with ICJ judgments: ‘Each Member 
of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.’ As Shabtai 
Rosenne noted, however, the broad language is deceptive in its simplic-
ity: ‘The undertaking to comply with the decisions of the Court does 
not indicate in whose favour the undertaking is given’,116 for instance. 
112 L Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2nd edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979) p 47.
113 Watts, n 55 above, p 41.
114 Higgins, n 103 above, p 3.
115 See C Paulson, ‘Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice 
since 1987’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 434.
116 Rosenne, n 99 above, p 205. 
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The vagueness of the relevant terms might explain the suggestion 
that the International Court of Justice is ‘a toothless bulldog’.117 But this 
underestimates the complex dynamics between the different organs of 
the United Nations when it comes to the enforcement of judicial deci-
sions.118 Most importantly, Article 94(2) of the Charter of the United 
Nations provides that:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under 
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the 
Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or 
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
Of course, it must be acknowledged that the Security Council has discre-
tion in this process of enforcement, which makes some say that Article 
94(2) ‘should not be overestimated as a means for executing judgments 
of the ICJ, in particular if “veto-powers” [that is, of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council] are concerned’.119 It is also true, how-
ever, that the full potential of the judicial enforcement provision of the UN 
Charter has not been really tested just because, on the ground, judgments 
of the International Court of Justice are complied with unreservedly in 
almost all instances.120 De facto, therefore, this last element of the rule 
of law value relating to the enforcement of legal norms is undoubtedly 
reflected in a satisfactory fashion onto the international plane, at least as 
regards the principal judicial organ of the UN system.
IV. CONCLUSION
To summarise, the above discussion has shown that the formal core val-
ues of the rule of law are indeed reflected, to a large extent, in the essential 
features of the international legal system. One may even be tempted to 
speak of an emerging ‘international rule of law’, in terms of the externalisa-
tion of rule of law values. The strongest claim is at the level of normativity 
117 GA Ajibola, ‘Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice’ in 
MK Bulterman and M Kuijer (eds), Compliance with Judgments of International Court: Proceedings 
of the Symposium Organised in Honour of Professor Henry G Schermers by Mordenate College and 
the Department of International Public Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) p 9 at p 11.
118 See M Al-Qahtani, ‘The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Enforcement of 
Its Judicial Decisions’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 781.
119 K Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 94 UN Charter’ in A Zimmermann, C Tomuschat and 
K Oellers-Frahm (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006) p 159 at p 175.
120 See SM Schwebel, ‘Commentary: Compliance with Judgments of the International 
Court of Justice,’ in MK Bulterman and M Kuijer (eds), Compliance with Judgments of 
International Court:Proceedings of the Symposium Organised in Honour of Professor Henry 
G Schermers by Mordenate College and the Department of International Public Law (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) p 39 at p 40.
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per se, where nobody nowadays would doubt that the conduct of states is 
ruled by law, that is to say by legal norms providing for certainty, predict-
ability and stability. The verdict as regards the functional dimension of the 
rule of law, concerning the creation and application of international law, is 
also relatively positive. International written legal norms found in treaties 
are promulgated satisfactorily and their publication is adequate; further-
more, international law is now universal in its reach and the fundamental 
principle of sovereign equality ensures that, in most cases (or with respect 
to most issues), similarly situated legal subjects (states) are treated in the 
same way; that is, without discrimination.
However, the institutional level remains problematic for the interna-
tional rule of law, in spite of improvements in recent years. The continu-
ing lack of compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice 
cannot be ignored, even if most states have committed to international 
adjudication through the optional clause. There is also a will to open the 
door to a power of judicial review for the ICJ, which could rule on the 
legality of the decisions of other UN organs, such as the Security Council. 
No one seriously contests the independence and impartiality of the 
International Court of Justice, and the judicial process is truly accessible 
to all states, the principal international legal subjects. In terms of effective-
ness, the record of compliance is outstanding, but the Security Council’s 
discretion over the ultimate enforcement of judgments still offends the 
international rule of law.
This picture of the situation of the rule of law on the international plane 
is, of course, flawed. I acknowledge that, in conducting the present analy-
sis, many choices had to be made in order to limit the scope of the inquiry. 
For instance, treaties were the only source of normativity examined in 
regard to the first set of rule of law values, with adjustments made to take 
into account the absence of a central norm-creating authority on the inter-
national plane. Similar limits applied for the discussion of the creation of 
legal norms, where international customary law was neglected. The ideal 
of equality was assessed in relation to states only, although the modern 
trend is to recognise an international role for other legal actors, such as 
individuals. Finally, I looked only at the International Court of Justice to 
see whether the rule of law values relating to the existence of a judicial 
system were reflected onto the international plane. In truth, the present 
discussion on the international rule of law is not meant to be comprehen-
sive. But it is a start. In fact, it is a serious effort to examine the situation 
of international law today, understood in traditional terms—with treaties 
as the main source, states as the principal actors, and the ICJ as the lead-
ing court.
By way of concluding remarks, it is opportune to bring back the theme 
of the social power of the ‘rule of law,’ that is of the ‘international rule of 
law’. The great success of this social–mental phenomenon has been noted 
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in both legal studies and political science.121 One may gain a sense of the 
popularity of the international rule of law language from the final docu-
ment of the 2005 World Summit, where some 170 heads of state and gov-
ernment met for a high-level plenary meeting at the sixtieth session of the 
United Nations General Assembly.122 The expression ‘rule of law’ is found 
no less than 12 times, including in the first section on ‘values and prin-
ciples’, as well as under the headings of development, human rights and 
investments. There is even a specific section on the rule of law, where the 
states recognise ‘the need for universal adherence to and implementation 
of the rule of law at both the national and international level’. Furthermore, 
it advocates the creation of a Rule of Law Assistance Unit within the 
Secretariat, ‘so as to strengthen United Nations activities to promote the 
rule of law, including through technical assistance and capacity-building’.
The language of the rule of law has fallen victim to its own success.123 
In a sense, it has become the new ‘buzzword’ (or ‘buzz-phrase’) at both 
the domestic and the international level, in terms of which political and 
justice enterprises are examined and explained.124 The modern vernacu-
lar of political science (mainly international relations theorists) and of 
legal studies (mainly constitutional theorists) has also adopted the ter-
minology of the rule of law with great enthusiasm, using it in relation to 
practically every aspect of the organising structure-system in society;125 
from regional criminal justice, to national transitional justice, to transna-
tional social justice; from domestic democratic reforms, to supranational 
institutional reforms, to international development reforms. I borrow 
from Ogden and Richard’s philosophy of language to suggest that the 
‘rule of law’ is a formulation of ‘Hurrah!’ words;126 that is to say, words 
121 See, for instance, D Jacobs, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006–07) 30 Harvard Journal 
of Law and Public Policy 15; and B Zangl, ‘Is there an Emerging International Rule of Law?’ 
(2005) 13 (suppl 1) European Review 73.
122 United Nations, World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1 (2005), available at www.
un.org/summit2005/.
123 For a taste of the far-reaching success of the rule of law language, see BZ Tamanaha, 
‘The Rule of Law for Everyone?’ (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 97 at 98–100.
124 See K Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives 
and Lessons Learnt’ (2006) World Bank Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention & 
Reconstruction 2006/37.
125 See the different contributions to the present volume, as well as in D Dyzenhaus (ed), 
Recrafting the Rule of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999). See also, at the purely domestic 
level, S Coyle, ‘Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 257; and DM Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004).
126 See CK Ogden and IA Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of 
Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism, 2nd edn (London: Kegan Paul, 1927) 
pp 149–50, where the authors suggest dividing the functions that language can fulfil into 
two categories, namely the symbolic use of words and the emotive use of them. In the latter 
function, language is used to express or excite feelings and attitudes; the language thus used 
can be referred to as ‘Hurrah!’ words and ‘Boo!’ words, because of the feelings, good or bad, 
that they bring to the speakers and/or listeners.
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that provoke a positive effect—that generate a good feeling in those who 
hear them.
Unfortunately, this is also true when the rule of law language is utilised 
by the Robert Mugabe and other tyrants of the world,127 or by economi-
cally aggressive state governments like that in Beijing.128 In short, there 
are reasons to be both happy and to be concerned about the externalisa-
tion of the concept,129 reasons to be simultaneously for and against the 
international rule of law.130
127 See statements reported in Tamanaha, n 123 above, pp 99–100.
128 See the Chinese Government’s statement on the rule of law at the national and interna-
tional levels, reported by Duan J in (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 185.
129 Every virtuous thing has a dark side, David Kennedy would say: see D Kennedy, 
The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).
130 I owe this formulation to Brian Tamanaha, who expressed a similar view with respect 
to the rule of law in general during a discussion at the Florence conference. See more gener-
ally, his contribution to the present volume (ch 1).

